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Abstract: This article attempts to make a critical evaluation of the working of the institutional 
system of democratic decentralization in rural India against the backdrop of its historical 
development. It has been argued that although it is not difficult to trace the roots of 
decentralized government in ancient India it hardly resembles the modern model of 
decentralization conceived and developed by a host of the Western scholars. The colonial rulers 
introduced decentralized governance in India to promote colonial objectives and to help 
perpetuate the British rule. The post- colonial state took steps to initiate the process of rural 
decentralization in 1950s but it went out of steam soon. In 1990s there was a paradigm shift in 
India’s policy. And in 1992 the Constitution was amended to pave the road for democratic 
decentralization but currently it seems to be in the cross-roads. This paper seeks to capture the 
historical development of the journey of decentralization and identify the roadblocks and the 
takeaways from the experience of working of the institutions of rural decentralization in India.  
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1. Introduction  
One of the most popular state forms that has opened spaces for a wider and deeper 
participation of citizens at the local level, is decentralization. It is this participative 
dimension which constitutes one of the basic pillars of good governance. The concept of 
good governance popularized by the World Bank for the purpose of ensuring loan 
repayment in sub-Saharan Africa focusing principally on management undermining 
politics, has undergone fundamental change over the last few decades It is now widely 
accepted as a new concept in governance with emphasis on decentralization, 
participation, transparency, civil society engagement and the like. 
Significantly, decentralization has got unprecedented momentum in the developing 
countries in 1990’s which was also coincided with the increasing acceptance of the of 
neo-liberal policy in the developing countries at the instance of the international 
financial organizations like the World Bank. However, in all but 12 of the 75 
developing countries' more than five million people have implemented some form of 
decentralization. Parallel to these developments, enabling legal frameworks and 
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institutional channels for citizen participation at the local level have been developed in 
many of these countries, as shown below: 
 
Legal Enabling Environment for People’s Participation 
Philippines  : Local Government Code (1990) 
India   : 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1993-94) 
Honduras  : Municipal Law (1990) 
Bolivia  : Popular Participation Law (1992) 
Namibia  : Local Authority Act (1992) 
Uganda  : Local Government Act (1997) 
Tanzania  : Local Authorities Act (1992) 
 
Selected Examples of Institutional Channels for People's Participation 
Tanzania  : Ward Development Committee 
Zimbabwe  : Village Development Committee 
Uganda  : Resistance Councils and Committees 
Nepal   : Village Development Council 
Colombia  : Overseeing Committees 
Bolivia  : Village Committees 
China   : Villagers’ Committees 
India   : Gram Sabhas and Ward Committees. 
 
It may be recalled that that decentralization as a politico-administrative mechanism 
for the expansion of the base of democracy found itself manifested in the form of local 
government. It gathered momentum in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century 
when inadequacies of the existing democratic government came to light, thanks to the 
contribution of the enlightened scholars and activists. The liberal school of thought felt 
that the institutions of local self-government need to be developed primarily for 
effecting improvement in administration, ensuring participation of the citizens in the 
processes of governance, protecting individual liberty and training the citizens in the art 
of the democratic government. According to Tocqueville, for example, town meetings 
are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s 
reach, they teach how to use and how to enjoy. John Stuart Mill stressed the educative 
function of the local government for securing twin benefits to the nation, namely: 
provision of a democratic training ground for the 19 the century town and country 
gentlemen in the local bodies some of whom might eventually be called upon to 
perform duties of national importance in Parliament and education for the broader 
electorate in the complicated task of exercising choices in matters of elections of 
representatives and allocation of resources  Bryce concurred with Mill in the virtues of 
local government institutions resulting from division of labor, political education and 
community of interests. Local institutions, he felt train men not only to work for others 
but also to work effectively with others (Bryce, 1983, quoted in Mutalib et al., 2002). 
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2. The Ancient Tradition of Local Governance in India  
The self-governing village communities had existed in India from the earliest times 
as is evident from their reference to the Rig Veda the origin of which can be traced back 
to 1200 BC. The village sabhas (village assemblies) and Gramins (senior persons of the 
village) used to act as links between the villagers and the higher authorities. In course of 
time these village bodies came to be known as the panchayats which remained 
unchanged even during mediaeval and Mughal period despite the fact the their judicial 
powers were reduced. 
 
3. The Colonial Perspective of Local Governance  
The administrative system in India broke down almost completely on the eve of the 
colonial rule. This was why the colonial government had to pass through “long and 
weary experiments in order to develop a sound administrative system” (Bhattarcharya 
and Datta, 1991). It was in the last phase of the rule of the East India Company and in 
the period immediately following the establishment of the direct rule of the Crown that 
consideration was paid, though in a small scale, to the supply of the services like health, 
sanitation, education, roads and the like. This need was highlighted by the Report of the 
Royal Army Sanitation, 1863.  
The Sepoy Mutiny caused a significant shift in the political perspective of the 
colonial rulers. Andrew Laing, member (Finance) of the Viceroy’s Council observed 
that the revolt of 1857 had put imperial finances under considerable strain and it was 
necessary to finance local services out of local taxation. Lord Lawrence, another 
member of the Viceroy’s Council, came out with resolutions emphasizing that Indians 
are capable of governing their local affairs themselves and the village communities were 
the most abiding of India’s institutions. They suggested that local services should be 
financed out of local taxes. Lord Mayo’s Resolution of 1874 led to the birth of local 
self-government in the villages primarily to harness local interest, supervision and care 
for the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical charity and 
public works. 
The growing industrial and commercial needs of the people of India and obligations 
towards the people perceived in liberal terms worsened the situation as it put pressure 
on the budgetary resources. The other important compulsions included fuller political 
and economic integration, need for building reliable information system extending right 
up to the villages because even after the Sepoy Mutiny there were sporadic peasant 
movements throughout the country and the need for recruiting new set of collaborators 
in the countryside apart from the existing zamindars. These collaborators represented 
big intermediaries, traders–cum-merchants and moneylenders who were becoming 
economically strong due to commercialization of agriculture. Their strength grew 
further following their being a part of the local governance system. One must also keep 
in mind that it was the time of the imperial expansion outside India characterized by the 
imperialist wars in different parts of Asia. And the charges for these were borne out of 
the Indian exchequer. Growing freedom movement posed a very serious threat to the 
colonial rule and decentralization in the form of local government was conceived as an 
institutional arrangement for the co-option of a section of the freedom fighters. 
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4.  Ripon’s Seminal Contribution  
The idea of local self-government received a remarkable turn in 1882 when Lord 
Ripon came out with his famous resolution which is regarded as the Magna Charta of 
the local democracy in India during the days of the colonial rule. He was the first to 
suggest that it was not primarily for effecting improvement in administration that local 
government has to be promoted. He argued that political education and administrative 
efficiency needed to be put into the perspective. He was interested in reviving and 
extending the indigenous system and to making “full use of what remains of the village 
system” (Wolf, 1921).   
The most remarkable innovation proposed by Ripon was the establishment of a 
network of rural local bodies–six years before there were any such Councils in 
England” (Tinker, 1968). Ripon’s proposals were given warm welcome by that stratum 
of society which was active in politics, namely, S.N. Banerjea, G.K. Gokhale. But he 
was unsuccessful in implementing his scheme. The District Boards met very 
infrequently. The landlord-members did not attend the meetings as they could not 
follow the unfamiliar procedure. A small group of lawyers could follow but they were 
not allowed to speak.  Added to it was the social scenario of the villages which came 
under the control of the local daroga (police) and the bania (money lenders) The 
Government of India did not extend necessary support. 
But the fact remains that Ripon was the first to emphasize that the legitimate 
aspirations of the westernized intelligentsia had to be satisfied not only through 
preponderant non-official majorities in the local bodies but also through the grant of the 
right to elect their chairman and whatever control the government had to exercise over 
local bodies, should be exercised from without, not from within. His liberalism drawing 
inspiration from Hume coupled with his understanding of the need for providing outlet 
to the westernized middle class helped him conceptualize local government not merely 
as instruments of effecting improvement in administration but also as instruments of 
popular and political education of the masses. 
 
5. Some Positive Initiatives 
True it is that the progress of local government on the lines of Ripon was 
insignificant but the fact remains that idea of local self- government as developed in 
Europe had gained currency and was accepted by the vanguard of the freedom struggle, 
Indian National Congress as the political ideal for the country in 1906. The Royal 
Commission on Decentralization (1907) recommended the constitution and 
development of village panchayats for the administration of the village affairs. But as in 
the case of the Ripon’s resolution, the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Decentralization remained on paper for which the Indian National Congress blamed the 
“inefficient bureaucracy”. 
Against this backdrop came the Montague –Chelmsford Reforms Act of Act of 1919 
in terms of which local government became a transferred subject. Although it meant 
transfer of the local government to the hands of the Indian ministers in the provinces 
local government could not emerge as democratic and vibrant instruments of self-
government at the village level. Till about 1920 local bodies were practically 
consultative bodies set up by the provincial governments to help them in administering 
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local affairs. The concept of local government as the agent of the higher level 
government practiced by the colonial rulers remained the guiding premise of local 
governance in colonial India. Incidentally, the freedom movement led by Gandhi 
accepted decentralization as the foundation of rural democracy in India. Gandhi talked 
to village swaraj and felt that the villages should be starting point of India’s democratic 
governance. 
However, the so-called democratization during the colonial rule was very limited 
because the franchise was restricted to local magnates and their cohorts. Secondly, the 
local government institutions set up by the colonial rulers were imposed from the above 
and as Bandypadhayay and others observe, remained loosely grafted to the indigenous 
rural society. They rightly observe that the old community based self-governing 
institutions and the newly created and superimposed bodies of local government failed 
to develop any creative relationship.  
 
6. The Rise of the First Generation Panchaytai Raj 
Strikingly, the post-colonial India failed to make significant and visible break with 
colonial past despite tall promises at the time of the nationalist movement and Gandhi’s 
insistence on village swaraj as the starting point of India’s democracy. The architects of 
the Constitution were primarily concerned about the unity and integrity of the country 
and the trauma of partition created necessary objective conditions to plead for it. This 
led to a situation where the colonial model of federalism with strong unitary bias was 
accepted for the country choking the rise and growth of liberal democratic local self-
governing institutions in India. There was no mention about the panchayati raj in the 
objective resolutions presented before the Constituent Assembly. The chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was opposed to the empowerment of the 
village panchayats presumably because of his unhappy personal experience in the 
villages in the early years of his life. He said in the Constituent Assembly, to quote, 
“Indian villages are sinks of localism, ignorance, narrow mindedness and communalism 
----------.” (Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development, 1966). 
A close study of the background leading to the rise of the first generation panchayati 
raj in India in late 1950s clearly indicates that there was unavoidable political 
compulsion at the end of the ruling party. The leaders of the Indian National Congress 
realized that as the freedom movement had a strong urban bias, rural people who stayed 
away from the mainstream, needed to be roped in through institutional mechanism for 
the consolidation of the political strength of the party. The ruling class had also felt the 
need for enlisting participation of the rural people in the implementation of the 
development programs conceived and directed from the center and through this, 
winning their political support. The first initiative in the form of the Community 
Development Program for the active involvement of the community in the 
implementation of the rural development programs, failed to evoke people’s initiative 
because the program was imposed from the top and there were no democratic structures 
to enlist participation of the community. This gave birth to the first generation 
panchayati raj in India on the basis of the recommendations of the Balvantray Mehta 
Committee report. There were internal contradictions because the attempt was made to 
involve people without replacing the strong colonial bureaucratic structures by the 
democratic structures. Added to it was the highly centralized governing system of the 
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country initially created by the constitution and subsequently promoted by the 
hegemonic rule of the Congress.  The three –tiered institutional structures created had 
faced challenges from within as it helped develop new centers of power leading to 
‘cooling off of enthusiasm of the members of Parliament’. The first generation 
panchaytai raj system collapsed in all states except Mahasrastra and Gujarat soon after 
Nehru’s death in 1964. 
 
7. The Journey of the Second Generation Panchayats 
The transfer of political power from the hands of the Indian National Congress to the 
coalition of several opposition parties in New Delhi in 1977 brought about a change in 
the national political atmosphere. The new government took steps to regenerate the 
stagnant panchayati raj for which they appointed a committee under the leadership of 
Asoka Mehta which submitted report in 1978. The Committee conceptualized 
panchayats in a more practical manner. It stressed the need for participation of political 
parties and felt the need for amending the constitution as an important step towards 
strengthening PRIs but the Government was very short-lived. Only three states, namely, 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal ruled by the regionally based political 
parties partly accepted the recommendations of the Committee. They had established 
and empowered village panchayats. But panchaytai raj as self-governing institutions 
did not grow properly except Karnataka presumably because the other two states wanted 
to use these bodies as centers of power for the consolidation, expansion and 
enhancement of their political strength in the countryside.  
 
8. The Emergence of the Third Generation Panchayats  
The most significant development in the career of rural local self-government took 
place in 1992 when the constitutional amendments were made to empower local 
government in both rural and urban areas. It was a time when India opted for neo-liberal 
policy. These two amendments (73rd and 74th amendments) constitutionalized local 
governance and sought to ensure democratization of the governing processes by making 
it mandatory to hold elections to local bodies at regular intervals under the aegis of a 
constitutional body called the State Election Commission.. Added to it was the mandate 
for creating direct democratic institutions in the form of gram sabhas in the countryside.  
They clarified the status of these bodies by defining them as institutions of self-
government and instruments of planning for economic development and social justice. 
The amendments gave directions to the state legislatures, though not mandatory, to 
devolve powers and responsibilities to them in order to enable them to function as 
institutions of self-government for which it provided for the Eleventh Schedule in the 
Act These two amendments provide for inclusive governance by providing for 
reservations of seats for women and the marginalized sections of the Indian society 
known as the Scheduled castes and tribes. Care was also taken to strengthen the 
financial base of the local bodies through the setting of Finance Commission at the state 
level.  
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9. The Anatomy of the New Crop of Local Government 
The 73rd Amendment was definitely a paradigmatic shift in the life of the rural local 
self-governance in India as it attempted to bring about a fundamental  change in the 
governing process of rural India though the installation of the constitutionally mandated  
democratic institutions as supplement to the bureaucratic institutions   at the district 
level and below. And good governance in the countryside was sought to be achieved 
through twin interconnected measures, namely, democratization of governance and 
institutionalization of participation of the villagers and empowerment of the local self-
governing institutions.  
But a close look at the processes out of which the idea emerged, would tend to show 
that he was primarily interested in developing an efficient delivery system in the 
countryside which might help in the long run to penetrate politically. Added to it were 
the political exigencies rooted in the political turmoil in the different parts of the 
country in 1970s and 1980s and considerations of power politics and compulsions of 
liberalization. The 1970s and 80s were marked by series of political upheavals based 
essentially on ethnic, religious and ethnic considerations. These movements had in fact 
posed a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state. Mention may be made of the 
militant agitations in the North East India and in Punjab and separate state movements 
in many parts of the country and state autonomy movements led by the opposition ruled 
parties. It became evident that that the state governments were not capable of 
responding to these challenges effectively. Presumably, it was realized by the ruling 
classes that highly centralized state system was ill-suited to address the situation and 
thus the focus was shifted to the decentralized institutionalized arrangements. Second, 
the power politics of the ruling Congress Party had also necessitated it because the party 
was out of power in many major states. The opposition ruled states came under one 
umbrella to demand more powers for the states. Caught in the vortex of crisis the Indian 
state might have thought of empowering panchayats as an effective measure of passing 
the buck on the constituent states and marginalizing them at the same time by creating a 
direct linkage with the panchayti raj institutions through a constitutional amendment. 
Third, the fundamental shift in the policy by accepting liberalization has also facilitated 
the process of empowerment of local democratic institutions to act as their messengers 
in the villages and to help absorb the shocks of the policy shift. More resource 
mobilization for meeting some of the increasing local needs was also on the agenda. 
One is again reminded of the compulsions and conditions of colonial phase of 
strengthening local government after 1887.  
 
10. Democratizing Local Governance: Where the Shoe Pinches 
In this section I propose to examine some of the major impediments to democratizing 
governance to demonstrate how they upset the applecart of good governance. One of the 
primary objectives of the amendment is to democratize governance by making provision 
for holding of elections at regular intervals But the hopes, as the experience indicates, 
are belied. Some of the states have taken years to hold elections. Postponing elections 
under one pretext or another has become a routine matter. It is found from the grounds 
for the postponement of elections in Gujarat, for example, elections to panchayats have 
been completed in many of the states after a series of legal battles and interventions by 
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the civil society organizations.  In Bihar a series of legal battles led to the delay in the 
holding of elections. The matter was resolved finally when the Supreme Court 
intervened to compel the state government to hold elections pending the decision on 
legal issues before the court.  The case of Orissa is more interesting. The elections to 
panchayat bodies were due to be held  before February 2002. The SEC had promptly 
intimated the state government its preparedness to conduct elections on time and 
suggested delimitation of wards and reservation of seats beforehand, if required. The 
District Magistrate had in fact done the work. The state government had ordered limited 
delimitation of seats in consonance with the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964. To 
cause further delay in this regard the state government brought a bill in the monsoon 
session for the reservation of seats in favor of the Other Backward castes. The SEC 
chose to file a case in the High Court. At this stage the state government decided to hold 
elections (Panchaytai  Raj Update 2003). Gujarat has recently set a unique example. 
The State Government has announced incentives to the extent of Rs. 1 lakh to those 
panchayats, which would be able to hold elections on the basis of consensus. The 
scheme called samras gram (harmonious village) is out and out anti-democratic. It is 
regarded as a recipe for reward-induced guided democracy. 
In a divided society like ours, spontaneous consensus in the interest of a large section 
of people is a myth. If there is at all any consensus, it is that of caste, religion etc. and 
basically class. It is a veiled attempt to guide local democracy from the top and in the 
interest of the ruling classes. The Santhanam Committee (1963) examined the scope of 
unanimity in panchayat elections. The Committee came across villages where the 
anxiety for unanimity and consensus meant the continuation of the traditional 
authorities and suppression of the new spirit of the youth. It was felt that the securing of 
unanimity through cash incentives was not desirable. The silver lining is that the people 
of Gujarat seem to have rejected the idea as is evident from the contests that 
characterized the elections in more than 90 per cent of the GPs. 
Interestingly, what is happening in some states in the name of achieving unanimity is 
a cause of serious concern. During the panchayat elections in Karnataka in 2000 some 
of the seats were auctioned. The Election Commission could not interfere on the ground 
that if the voters made an arrangement among themselves to ensure unanimous election 
it was beyond the legal competence of the Commission to intervene .In order to 
augment the resources some of the seats were put to bidding in Andhra Pradesh in 
2001.Even the reserved seats were not spared. The highest amount for the post of the 
Sarpanch in Velpur village under Guntur district was 10.10 lakh (Mukherjee, 2008). 
Seats are auctioned in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In 2005, auctions were held for 
the post of Sarpanch in at least two gram panchayats.   In Madhya Pradesh It was   a 
case of trade off in - the post cost 1.80 lakh In Rajasthan it was the caste factor which 
mattered most. The panchayat dominated by the Gujjars was reserved for the SCs. 
Disturbed by the sudden loss of power, some of the influential Gujjar leaders decided to 
extract a price for the post. An announcement for open sale was made at the village 
chaupal (meeting place) assuring unanimous election of the highest bidder. The auction 
took place two weeks before the day of polling. The reserved price was fixed at Rs.50, 
000. One person offered Rs.2.7 lakh and the seat was allotted to him. But the effort 
proved to be abortive because of the intervention of the District Collector who got three 
of them arrested (Panchaytai Raj Update, 2005).  
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The electoral processes have been criminalized in some of the states like Uttar 
Pradesh (UP) Bihar.  In the intermediate panchayat elections in UP there was blood 
bath, which resulted in the killing of 200 persons. Dalits were threatened with dire 
consequences. The Election Commission had to ban the entry of two ministers into their 
native blocks wherefrom their wives were contesting (Panchayati Raj Update, 2005). 
One contestant for the ZP Presidentship had 42 criminal cases against him. 
There was large scale distribution of gifts and allurements offered by the candidates 
in UP elections held in 2005, some of them were financed by the non-resident Indian 
relatives. There was a free flow of money and liquor in many villages. Hand pumps 
were installed outside each house in one of the villages and voters in one of the villages 
received silver rings and glasses. A candidate in one village called Pratapgarh promised 
gold rings to each woman in the GP if he won. In several constituencies whisky bottles 
were distributed liberally. There was hardly any serious candidate who did not exceed 
the expenditure ceiling fixed by the SEC. The local newspapers were splashed with 
advertisements by the well-to-do candidates (Panchayati Raj Update, 2005).   
 
11. Institutionalizing Participation:  The Working of Gram Sabhas  
Gram Sabha did not figure prominently in the scheme of the panchayati raj 
introduced in most states in early 1960s.We find from the report of the Ashok Mehta 
that the sporadic efforts to revive the institution were not successful due to" the lack of 
interest on the part of the office bearers and the apathy on the part of the public, the 
gram sabha has not been functioning satisfactorily."      
While the constitution makes it mandatory to establish Gram Sabha at the village 
level, it does not stipulate any details regarding the structure, powers, and functions of 
this institution.  In terms of Article 243G these details are to be spelt out in the 
panchayati raj legislations passed in each state in compliance with the 73rd amendment 
of the Constitution. Accordingly, all the state governments have provided for the 
institution of Gram Sabha in their respective panchayat legislations. But the jurisdiction 
of the Gram Sabha (GS) in state legislations is too big to facilitate effective 
participation of the people. In states like Kerala, West Bengal and Orissa the problem 
has been resolved by creating another body down the line at the electoral constituency 
level to ensure effective participation of the people (Datta, 1997; 2000).  
Hardly any State Acts empower the GS to have control over the GP and to take final 
decisions in matters of village development. Its role is only advisory. The accountability 
of the GP to this body has also not been clearly spelt out in most of the state 
legislations. In most of the states the functional domain of the GS is limited to 
discussions of annual statement of accounts, administration report, and selection of 
beneficiaries for poverty alleviation programs. Only in a few states like Haryana, Punjab 
and Tamil Nadu the GSs enjoy the powers to approve the budgets.  
The Gram Sabhas are yet to take off properly in almost all the states (Datta, 2006). 
Reports from the states indicate that the Gram Sabha meetings are not being held 
regularly. The Institute of Social Sciences team had found in a village in Madhya 
Pradesh that by December 1995, three meetings were held as against the legal 
requirement of six meetings.  
The MP study done by Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) group of researchers 
shows that majority of them did not attend meetings because the people felt that nothing 
Journal of Asian Rural Studies, 2019, 3(1): 17-34 
ISSN: 2548-3269 
Published by Hasanuddin University and Asian Rural Sociology Association 
 
 
26 
 
happened at such meetings. Nirmala Buch conducted a study of 11 Gram Panchayats in 
MP in December 1997 and found that far from an adequate number of GS members 
attending the meetings even all the panchs were not  (Buch, nd.) To cap it all, there was 
no quorum in more than 50 per cent of the GS meetings. There is a provision for 
mandatory attendance of one-tenth members in the Gram Sabha.  
The Participatory Research in Asia team has noticed that although meetings are 
being held almost regularly, quorum is hardly achieved. And surprisingly, despite the 
lack of quorum, the proceedings are prepared. While talking to the members present in 
the meeting, the researchers felt that many of them were confused about the role of the 
Gram Sabha. Some of them perceive the Gram Sabha meetings as the political meetings 
and the only function of the Gram Sabha is to prepare the list of beneficiaries under the 
different anti-poverty programs.  
An authoritative survey of panchayati raj by NIRD reports as follows: almost all the 
State Acts have provided for Gram Sabha but its functions have not been spelt out in 
detail. Consequently, these institutions by and large continue to function ineffectively, 
though the meetings are generally held as prescribed. The purpose is hardly served in 
the absence of clear and direct mandate. More often than not, there is a tendency to 
conduct the meetings in a formal manner and finalize the proceedings in haste. The 
prescribed quorum is also not given due importance. The absence of women folk in the 
meetings has been a common feature. The participation of the people belonging to the 
weaker section has been marginal. Lack of literacy makes it difficult for many to 
effectively voice their demands in the meetings. 
But the fact still remains that in some of the States Gram Sabha meetings are 
generating a new atmosphere in the countryside. Social auditing at the Gram Sabha 
meetings has also started yielding desirable results. The Gram Sabha meeting in 
Karnataka successfully combated the time-honored Devdasi system, which prevailed in 
167 villages of Belgaun district (Menon, 1996). The UMA Research team of Bangalore 
had witnessed a Gram Sabha meeting at Indore Gram Panchayat in Uttar Kanada 
district (UMA Prachar, nd.) . The Sabha witnessed uproarious scene when the people 
demanded an explanation from the secretary about the activities despite the fact a 
handful of members were familiar with the Act. Most of the questions were raised by 
the youth. The elders had hardly opened their lips. 
 
12.  The Emerging Challenges: The MP Local Area Development (MPLAD) 
Scheme 
The actions taken by the Indian State after the amendment of the Constitution did not 
prove that there was strong political support for strengthening decentralized local 
governance in rural India. Mention may be made of the decision of the Indian State to 
introduce Members of Parliament Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme. Under 
this scheme a large sum of money per year is placed at the disposal of the MPs. The 
MPs are allowed to spend the money to undertake local area development schemes 
outside the purview of panchayats and municipalities. In this way the constitutionally 
mandated local government institutions are bypassed.  Under the scheme each MP can 
suggest to the District Collector works worth up to Rs. 2 crores ( now increased to 4 
crores) in a year. The Ministry releases the funds directly to the Collectors who get the 
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works done on the advice of the concerned MP. The funds should be used for creation 
of durable assets to be vested in government. The Central Government has given an 
illustrative list of 28 items. There is also a list of works not permissible such as rising of 
memorials, building of places of worship and the like. Incidentally, the State 
Governments are also not lagging behind in undermining the authority of the 
decentralized constitutional bodies. Some of the State Governments have also 
introduced similar program for the MLAs. 
However, the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (2001) showed that the 
MPLAD was plagued not only by the inadequacy of funds but also by the increasing 
underutilization, misuse and diversion of money earmarked for the project. Most of the 
plans undertaken form part of the 11th and 12th Schedules incorporated in the 73rd and 
74th Amendments of the Constitution which clearly refer to the functions that are to be 
transferred to the local bodies. The Report noted that out of Rs. 5018 crores only Rs. 
3221 i.e. 64 per cent of the released amount could be spent. Also, the release of funds 
was not linked up to their end- use, with utilization certificates being received for only 
29.78% of the projects taken up and completed by the implementing agency. While 
during 1993- 97, 89% of the work sanctioned by the collector was taken up, only 
56.13% of it could actually be completed. The corresponding percentages further 
declined to 86.41% and 39.42% respectively, during 1997- 2000. This was due to the 
fact that the Ministry often released funds without any co-relation with the end use and 
it did not insist on the utilization certificates from the implementing agencies. 
Similar has been the findings of the sample study of audit in 106 constituencies 
where it was found that out of total expenditure of Rs.265 crores reported by the 
Collectors, a sum of Rs. 82 crores, that is, 31 per cent of the total money was, in fact, 
not spent at all. The guidelines seem to have been observed more in their breach. In 
Nagaland, for example, the money was spent for building roads connecting the Church, 
in Orissa temples were built, in Madhya Pradesh money was spent for building housing 
complex for the police officials (Sezhiyan, 2002).  
The Centre for Budget and Governance (2004) in its report, The Rhetoric and Reality 
of MPLADS reviews the working of the said scheme in seven constituencies spread 
across six Indian states- Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand 
and Orissa. The report holds the legislators of both the houses responsible for the 
underutilization of funds. While the Lok Sabha members (till 2003) used only 77% of 
their total entitlement, the amount used by the Rajya Sabha members did not exceed 
50%.. The report also studied the scheme’s beneficiaries across six states. The overall 
picture that emerges is that a lion’s share of the MPLAD funds is spent in a top- down 
manner without taking into consideration people’s actual needs. Beneficiaries also 
alleged that they were paid much less than the specified minimum wages in 
employment works under the scheme and an overwhelming number (62%) agreed that 
the quality of assets created was either bad or very bad (Tripathi, 2004).   
Some critics feel that most of the schemes being funded and executed form part of 
the 11th and 12th schedules to the Constitution which define the functional domain of the 
panchayats and municipalities. The guidelines authorizing the MPs to exercise their 
personal choice and decision in funding and executing the scheme lead to usurpation of 
the power and responsibilities of the local bodies. It has been argued that in many 
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instances the choice of schemes and amounts expected can significantly alter or distort 
local priorities as may be decided or desired by the local bodies. 
 
13. Devolution in the Conformity Legislations 
The Eleventh Schedule does not list subjects or functions but only matters, as T.N. 
Srivastava (2002) pointed out. There is no constitutional mandate that rural local bodies 
would perform these functions or these would be transferred to rural local bodies or the 
schemes related to them will be entrusted to them for implementation. The legislature of 
a state is required to endow these bodies with such functions as may be necessary to 
enable them to function as institutions of self-government .Such law may contain 
provisions for devolution of powers and responsibilities subject to such conditions as 
may be specified therein and for the implementation of schemes for economic 
development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those mentioned 
in the Eleventh Schedule. The state legislature is thus sole determinant of self-
government The repeated usage of the word ‘may’ in the Article fails to make it  
mandatory on the part of the state government to implement these provisions, thus 
leaving power- sharing with the state government solely at the disposal of the political 
leadership at the state level. Presumably the Parliament was compelled to use the word 
'may' because some of the items come under the purview of the state list.  It is also a 
clear indication that the Indian state lacks genuine will to create a vibrant third layer in 
the governance structures of the country. It is also indicative of the fact that it is not 
possible to strengthen the process of decentralization in India without overhauling the 
existing center-state relationship. Thus panchayats cannot enjoy full autonomy as they 
are set within the states and form part of the state list. Nor can the states for that matter 
as they are placed within the Indian union. What the Seventy Third Amendment has 
done, as Mukerjee (1994) tells us, is to constitutionalize three strata of government.  
As per the information available in November 2006, only eight states and one Union 
territory have formally transferred all the 29 functions or subjects to the PRIs (Bryce, 
2002). The Working Group on the Decentralized Planning observes, “...... items listed as 
responsibilities in the states are couched in vague terms. A glance at the variety of these 
items reveals that they are shopping list of sectors and sub-sectors, broad activities in a 
sub-sector and activities, sub-activities/specific responsibilities under a broad activity, 
with no role clarity.... In some states the line departments still exercise the powers of 
supervision and control over the scheme of subjects transferred to the panchayats” (The 
Report of the Working Group on Decentralized Planning and Panchayati Raj 
Institutions for the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007). The Parliamentary Committee in 
its 37th report submitted in 2003 expressed concern at the pace at which the states are 
working in this direction. The Report of the Task Force on the Devolution of Powers 
and Functions to the PRIs brought out by the Ministry of Rural Development has 
admitted that the mandatory provisions of the 73rd Amendment Act are yet to be 
implemented in latter and spirit by most of the states/UTs even eight years after the said 
Act brought into force in April, 1993 
The lack of clarity in functional allocation and absence of desegregation into detailed 
activities as Panchayati Raj Development Report 1995 mentions, has led to 
considerable overlapping and duality of control in most cases. It has been argued in the 
report that the functional autonomy is rendered difficult because in almost all the states, 
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the state governments retain the power to assign, amend or withhold functions which as 
per the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution, is a job only the state governments are 
authorized to do. 
 
14. Transfer of Funds 
The transfer of functions without corresponding transfer of funds does not make 
sense. But this has happened. Mahi Pal rightly says that before listing the functions to 
be performed by the panchayats, the states have introduced certain qualifying clauses 
(Pal, 2004). In Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Tamil Nadu it is “within the limits of its 
funds”. In Punjab “it is to the extent its funds allow to perform”. In Madhya Pradesh and 
Himachal Pradesh, it is “as far as the gram panchayat funds at its disposal”. 
A critical review of the provisions in the Acts of the different states regarding tax 
assignments, tax sharing, non- tax revenues makes it very clear that the PRIs at the level 
of the samiti and parishad do not have independent taxing powers. Most of the taxes are 
assigned at the GP levels. 
The Constitution provides for setting up of the State Finance Commission (SFCs). 
By mid –1990s the first SFCs had submitted their reports. Referring to the role of the 
SFCs the mid-term appraisal of the Ninth Plan pointed out, “more buoyant taxes like 
sales tax and excise are kept out of the purview of the PRIs. All SFCs have put great 
emphasis on internal revenue mobilization but none has suggested any effective 
mechanism for PRIs to generate their revenue. The SFC reports have paid less attention 
to issues of autonomy, financial management and auditing proceedings. The state 
governments have also been slow and hesitant in accepting the recommendations where 
they are useful in terms of improving the revenue generation capacity of the local 
bodies. Only two states – Karnataka and Sikkim – have devolved funds to the 
panchayats for 29 subjects.  
A study of 15 select states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharastra, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Punjab, Haryana, Assam, Goa reveals that 
where middle or top tiers have been constituted, states have not endowed them with 
adequate functional responsibility. Most states have granted a plethora of functional 
responsibilities but no executive follow up of granting adequate powers, staff and 
financial resources.  Significantly, a study of panchayats in 15 states done by National 
Institute of Rural Development, shows that the political parties are reluctant to devolve 
powers.   
 
15. Transfer of Functionaries 
To function effectively as institutions of self-government the PRIs need to have the 
power to recruit and control staff required for managing its functions. Staff is a resource 
that an organization must possess to perform its activities. Strangely, Part IX and IXA 
of the Indian constitution remain silent on this vital aspect of institutional autonomy. 
Viewed from this perspective the state panchayat legislations too present an indeed 
gloomy picture. The state governments still have retained for themselves the power for 
inspection, inquiring into the affairs of the panchayats, suspension of panchayat 
resolutions and issuing directions. Besides in most states the key functionaries, namely, 
the secretaries and executive officers at all the three levels of panchayats are state 
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government employees who are appointed, transferred and controlled by the state 
government. Being under the direct control of the state administrative hierarchy they are 
often reluctant to work under the administrative control of the elected panchayats. 
Moreover, provisions for the deputation of officials from the state government to the 
panchayats have been made in the state panchayat Acts without consultation with the 
panchayats. The tenure, transfer and the promotion of deputationists are also decided by 
the state government without consulting the panchayats. 
 
16. Centrally Sponsored Schemes  
The creation of a large number of programs (more than 200 schemes currently) 
called centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) sponsored by the Union Ministries has posed 
a serious challenge to constitutionally mandated democratic decentralization by 
distorting the multilevel planning process and inter-governmental transfer arrangements 
within the federal set up. This is mainly because many of the subjects they deal with are 
either included in the State list or the ‘local list’ mentioned in the 11 and 12th schedules. 
The share of the CSSs in the plan budget of the federal government has shot up to 70 
per cent against less than 30 per cent in the early 1980s. Besides the CSSs, there are also 
26 sectorial programs falling under 29 subjects of the 11th Schedule which the central 
ministries handle. The schemes are drawn up at the center and implemented at the local 
level. The association of local bodies with the implementation processes does not really 
serve the purpose because the implementing bodies only implement according to the 
rules laid down elsewhere. The local government has to accept them because the center 
has financial clout. 
 
17. Rise of Parallel Bodies  
The emergence of a series of parallel bodies in different states has been very 
detrimental as they infringe on the jurisdiction of the panchayats. Broadly speaking, the 
functions performed by the parallel bodies can be classified as ensuring user -
beneficiary participation, convergence of programs and promoting efficiency. While 
these are the basic functions of the PRIs, the matters like irrigation, watershed 
management and development and minor forest produce come under the purview of the 
Eleventh Schedule which lays down the functions of the PRIs .The Gram Vikas Samity 
in Haryana and the Vigilance Committee in Himachal Pradesh, for example, encroach 
upon the statutory functions of the panchayat bodies as spelt out in the Panchayat Acts 
of the respective states. The Task Force on PRIs has argued that the Village 
Development Committee set up by the Government of Haryana negate the provisions of 
the 73rd Amendment Act regarding reservation of SC, woman and seems to replace the 
elected gram panchayats. The Janmabhoomi (JB) programme in Andhra Pradesh tends 
to mobilize local people, the entire state administrative machinery and draws upon all 
the existing central and state government schemes as resource for development work 
and thus substitute the functions of the Gram Panchayat. Although the Sarpanch is to 
preside over the JB Gram Sabha, the real player is the officer. It has created another 
problem. The Gram Sabha meetings convened by the Gram Panchayat have become 
less important because of the realization on the part of the people that fewer benefits are 
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available through panchayats. The Task Force on PRIs observes that it has a content of 
people’s participation and social mobilization, but it bypasses PRIs. 
It is a veiled attempt to bureaucratize rural governance Bureaucrats in local 
governments, especially gram panchayat secretaries, continue to exercise considerable 
influence over elected representatives as they are the repository of information 
contained in the government orders that may not be readily accessible to the elected 
representatives who lack an understanding of the official procedures or basic literacy 
skills. In Assam the co-ordination committee of the PRIs in Tinsukia district 
complained against the block development officers who were keeping the cheque books, 
ledgers and other important files with themselves (Panchayati Raj Update, 2003). In the 
name of control and supervision the bureaucracy has been given overriding powers over 
the elected panchayats in every state legislation. Such laws permit the higher echelons 
of bureaucracy to suspend and supersede panchayats. In a couple of states like Haryana 
, the Act had given the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad the authority to 
refuse to implement any of its resolutions if considered by him not to be in the public 
interest.  
There have been cases when the senior officials were found trying to thwart the role 
of the PRIs and curtail the power of the elected panchayats. The point has been 
succinctly brought out in the NIRD study. In Madhya Pradesh it was reported in the 
newspaper in 1996 that there were at least half a dozen cases of district level 
government officials being involved in brawls with the panchayat leaders. As a result of 
this rift the functioning of panchayats in at least 12 villages came to a halt (The 
Telegraph, 1996). 
There is another set of parallel bodies in some states where exist traditional 
panchayats with different legitimizing sources. In Maharastra, for example, there exist 
village “collectives” called gavki The gavki is constituted by the upper caste elites , the 
rich and undoubtedly, only the patriachs of the village, women excluded. Before the 
amendment of the constitution these bodies functioned alongside the elected 
panchayats. Unfortunately, they continue even today. Lele narrates an interesting case 
of how a gavki defied the elected panchayat. The gavki decided to auction the sand from 
the riverbed and the money earned was to be a contribution to its own fund. The GP 
raised objection to it leading to a conflict situation. The persons who raised objection to 
this issue, were the more informed active villagers, some dalits and women, associated 
with a local NGO who were in favour of the panchayats However, they do not have 
strength to go against the gavki’ The gavki has been found to be more effective in areas 
where women or dalits are in power. Thus, as Lele rightly observes “reservations which 
intended to empower both these marginalized sections in rural governance are being 
made ineffective by the established powers in the rural areas”(Lele, 2001).   
Caste Panchayats in some states have outgrown their functions as local dispensers of 
justice. Recently a caste panchayat in Nauranjabad village in UP’s Meerut district ruled 
that a young woman pregnant with the child of her second husband, return to her first 
husband who had reappeared after five years. The argument was that the first husband, 
though assumed dead, had never divorced her. Married off at just 14 to soldier 
Mohammed Arif Gudiya had barely spent a week with him when Arif was called to 
duty at Kargil War. Declared deserter by the army soon after he was given up dead as 
time went by. After four years ‘widowed’ Gudiya’s parents with the consent of the 
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community married her off to her cousin Tontiq. Gudiya became pregnant. Now the 
caste panchayat declared her second marriage illegal. The constitutional panchayat has 
nothing to do (Outlook, October 11, 2004).  
The general reaction against the parallel bodies is that they represent processes 
external to the constitutionally mandated role of panchayats and enable bureaucracies to 
override democratic bodies. Thus, they pose serious threats to the effective functioning 
of local self- governing institutions.  
 
18. Another Mode of Bureaucratisation: District Rural Development Agencies  
The bureaucratic District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs), which function 
independently of the Zilla Parishad and handle crores of rupees, should have 
disappeared from the scene following the 73rd amendment of the Constitution. But no 
such signs are visible even after more than one decade of the constitutional amendment. 
Instead both the Government of India and the state governments are not only continuing 
with them but are also adding to the list, circumscribing the powers, authority and 
prestige of the panchayats. The DRDAs were constituted as late as in 2002 in Goa.  
 Concluding Observations  
 It is clear that the Western liberal concept of local self-government drawing its 
impulse from the local areas has never been practiced in India. Local governance system 
during the days of the colonial rule emerged out of the economic, political and 
administrative compulsions of the colonial rulers. The freedom movement under the 
leadership of Gandhi highlighted the need for developing and strengthening rural local 
governance but the emotions generated died down because of the lack of objective 
conditions.  The new ruling classes (politicians and the bureaucracy together) paid a lip 
service to democratic decentralization because they were essentially interested in 
strengthening their political support base. The first generation rural local governance 
failed to strike firm roots because of the inadequate political support and bureaucratic 
resistance coupled with socio-economic realities of rural India. The institutions imposed 
from the top took shape on the ground in which castism, communalism and economic 
inequality sharply divided the villagers. The institutions were captured by the elites who 
used them for distribution of patronage and domination in the villages. One can remark 
that colonial tradition of local governance continues unabated in post-colonial India. 
The constitutional attempt to break colonial tradition in 1992 does not seem to be 
working properly on the ground because the threats to local democracy in rural India lie 
deeply embedded in Indian constitution, polity and economy (Datta, 2009). The demand 
for a though restructuring of the center-state relationship was first strongly put forward 
after the re-organization of the country in 1950s as it created contradictions between 
decentralized polity and centralized constitution. The Indian state had to appoint a 
Committee to review this issue again in 1980s but nothing substantive has emerged so 
far. The National Democratic Alliance government in Delhi had taken steps towards this 
direction but without any results. The present United Progressive Alliance government 
is not lagging behind but nothing visible has happened so far. All these initiatives 
underscore the need for a though re-examination of this aspect of the Indian 
Constitution as an essential step to empower local government in rural India. The 
Constitution was amended to strengthen local governance in rural India without 
resolving these basic contradictions. Local government continues to be in the state list 
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but the state governments in India are very weak. Can a weak state government deliver a 
healthy baby of local self-government? The point was hinted at by E.MS 
Namboodiripad who gave a dissenting note in the Report of the Ashoka Mehta 
Committee. Another contradiction raised by EMS Namboodiripad relates to the 
distinction between regulatory and developmental functions. The panchayat bodies have 
been entrusted with the developmental functions but they have been given no control 
over the regulatory machinery of the state at the village level. This distinction weakens 
the base of local democratic body and retards its functioning. The constitutional 
amendment has not addressed this issue. 
A close study of the trail of campaigns in the recent assembly elections held in 2011  
tend to show that the national issues of corruption and price rise figured very 
prominently and results  have gone the against the principal ruling party in India which 
has been the vanguard of liberalization. Interestingly these issues dominated the 
discussions in the last meeting of the National Development Council held in October, 
2012. And the issue of democracy at the grassroots did not receive any attention.  
Against the backdrop of the larger crisis of the state local democracy seems to have 
taken back seat. 
The fact however remains that the constitutionalization of the local governance has 
changed the legal status of the panchaytai raj system. Panchayati raj is no longer an 
idea but a practice. Elections can no longer be left to the sweet will of the ruling parties 
or parties at the state level, as had been the case earlier. The constitutional provisions 
have laid the foundation stone of local government the superstructures of which have to 
be built up for which what is urgently needed is spontaneous initiative on the part of the 
people and inter-governmental co-operation  
There is some ray of hope following the rise and growth of the civil society 
organization in India working for democratization of governance. But the increasing 
attempts on the part of the political parties to capture, control and influence the working 
of the civil societies raises questions. Right to information has strengthened their hands. 
But one has reasons to be doubtful about the bright future of grassroots democracy 
because globalization and liberalization are hitting the “local “hard.  One may argue that 
the current emphasis on local autonomy and resource mobilization for financing local 
services smacks of the colonial brand of local governance.  
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